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Abstract
This paper introduces the combination of an equilibrium model for elec-
tricity- and certificate supply and demand of and real options valuation
theory for evaluating the effectiveness of support schemes applied in the
electricity market. We study how a green certificate scheme affects invest-
ment behavior for a potential wind farm. The investor is assumed to take
into account the micro-structural properties of supply and demand through
explicitly considering a simultaneous equilibrium in the green certificate
market and the electricity market. The source of uncertainty in the model
lies in the investment cost, which is described as a mean reverting process.
At any time the investor possesses an option to develop the wind farm or
postpone the decision. Regarding future revenues as deterministic and the
investment cost as a one-time expense at exercise, we derive a real options-
based rule for the optimal investment timing. Using the Swedish/Norwegian
green certificate market as foundation for calibration and focusing on sup-
port scheme efficiency, the resulting renewable power development rates are
compared to the case where there are no subsidies, as well as the case of
a feed-in tariff system. We highlight policy insights from investment as-
pects that interact with the simultaneous equilibrium in the electricity and
green certificate markets. We conclude that for the specific goal of boost-
ing investment in production capacity for renewable energy, and within the
framework constructed by the assumptions made in this model, the feed-in
tariff will perform better than the green certificate scheme.
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pervisor, Stein-Erik Fleten for great support and guidance through the process.
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Sammendrag
Denne artikkelen introduserer en kombinasjon av en likevektsmodell for tilbud
og etterspørsel av elektrisitet sertifikater og en realopsjonsmodell for a˚ vurdere
effektiviteten av støtteordninger som benyttes i kraftmarkedet. Vi studerer hvor-
dan en ordning med grønne sertifikater p˚avirker investeringsatferd i en poten-
siell vindpark. Investoren antas a˚ ta hensyn til mikrostrukturelle egenskaper i
tilbud og etterspørsel gjennom eksplisitt a˚ vurdere en samtidig likevekt i sertifikat-
og kraftmarkedet. Usikkerhetskilden i modellen ligger i investeringskostnaden
og er beskrevet som en middelreverserende prosess. Til enhver tid besitter in-
vestoren en opsjon om a˚ utvikle vindparken eller utsette investeringen. Ved a˚
anse fremtidige inntekter som deterministiske og investeringskostnaden som en
engangskostnad, utarbeider vi en realopsjonsbasert regel for optimalisering av
investeringstidspunktet. Modellen kalibreres mot det svensk/norske sertifikat-
markedet og ved a˚ fokusere p˚a støtteordningens effektivitet, sammenlignes resul-
tatene for utviklingsraten for fornybar kraft med markedet hvor det ikke er noen
subsidieordning, og et ”feed-in tariff” system. Vi fremhever de systemegenskaper
som fra et investeringsaspekt p˚avirkes av en samtidig likevekt i elektrisitet- og ser-
tifikatmarkedet. Vi konkluderer med at for det konkrete m˚al om a˚ øke investeringer
i produksjonskapasitet for fornybare energikilder, og innenfor de rammer definert
i oppgaven, vil feed-in tariff prestere bedre enn ordningen med grønne sertifikater.
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1 Introduction
During the past decades there have been introduced numerous long- and short-term
targets associated with energy production and the reduction of related greenhouse-
gas emissions. Ambitious goals have been set on both national and global levels
and the optimal path to their fulfillment is a topic of high political priority. The
legislative methods applied in order to meet the objectives vary greatly among
nations, but are in terms of energy economics defined as either price- or quantity-
based mechanisms. These tools apply different philosophies in order to cause
behavioral change in the market. The price-based mechanism uses price changes
to induce investment and research in production technology for renewable energy
sources. The dominating alternative in this group is the feed-in tariff scheme, in
which the price of renewable energy is exogenously set by the government, securing
the producers’ revenue. Conversely, the quantity-based mechanisms incentivises
investment by introducing requirements to the production quantity. The most
representative approach of this group is the green certificate trading (GC) scheme,
which by imposing a set ratio of the electricity sold to originate from renewable
energy sources sets the ratio of renewable supply relative to the total electricity
production.
The renewable certificate- and feed-in tariff schemes are similar with respect to
having the goal of achieving increased investment and research within renewable
energy production technology by minimizing the risk of the investor. However,
their approaches to achieve this goal are quite different. Through a feed-in tariff,
the government offers a long term contract and a guaranteed per unit price to
the renewable energy producer to diminish their price risk1. The GC scheme is
one of the newer policies applied in the energy market and has been adopted
by several nations, among them USA, Norway, Sweden and UK. These countries
however represent very different configurations. The common denominator is the
awarding of a tradable certificate to the producer of renewable energy for one preset
unit of electricity. Demand for these certificates is constructed through a penalty
to be paid by the distributor per certificate they fail to procure according to a
governmentally set required quota. The sale of these certificates hence removes
some of the risk of investing in environmentally friendly production facilities by
securing a second source of income.
1There are several different price contracts in use, where the most widely used category is
defined as the ”fixed-feed-in tariff”. In this configuration, the government fixes the level of per
kWh compensation the renewable producer is to receive.
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This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on the choice and design of
a support policy by using our equilibrium-real options-framework to compare the
GC scheme to its closest alternatives. Focus will be placed on the comparison of
the systems’ abilities of leading to successful accomplishment of the environmen-
tal goals. An example of an article presenting a scheme comparison is Morthorst
(2003), which states that a system with GCs alone will not be effective in reaching
the goals for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, but if GCs are combined with
emission penalties this could have satisfying results. Huisman et al. (2013) argues
that the risk-minimizing nature of the feed-in tariff scheme makes it lucrative for
the investor, as most of the price risk is diminished by the fixed per kWh-price
set by the government. However, it is also suggested that the risk of the gov-
ernment abandoning the scheme due to cost issues rises as it is more successful.
This paradox is the topic of study for several articles, among them Amundsen
& Mortensen (2001), Jensen & Skytte (2002), and Fischer (2006). These works
present proof that the power price will go down as a result of increasing market
share for renewable energy in a price competitive market due to the low marginal
cost. Hence, the price risk that the investor avoids through the government’s price
guarantee is replaced with the risk of the government abandoning the scheme or
substituting it with another. This policy uncertainty is naturally present in all
schemes and hence thoroughly discussed in the literature. Boomsma & Linnerud
(2013) aim to shed light on how uncertainty connected to the support scheme can
affect the rate at which investment is undertaken by dividing the risk into two
parts; market uncertainty and policy uncertainty. Market uncertainty will vary
according to the scheme’s specifications2. Policy uncertainty affects all schemes
by reflecting the government’s ability to change the market environment by either
terminating the support scheme, make revisions in its regulatory conditions or
switch among the schemes. Similarly, Fagiani & Hakvoort (2014) studies the role
of regulatory changes on price volatility using a case study based on the Swedish
market. It presents results showing that regulatory changes following the planning
of the implementation of Norway into the Swedish system generated a regime of
higher volatility in the market between 2010 and 2011.
In terms of scheme success and efficiency, this article looks at dynamic efficiency
as a measure of attractiveness. del R´ıo (2012) defines dynamic efficiency as ”the
capacity of an instrument (or a design element) to induce a continuous incentive
for technological improvements and cost reductions in the existing renewable energy
technologies, facilitate that emerging technology’s advance along the technological
2A fixed feed-in tariff scheme is connected with no, or very little, market risk as the government
has imposed a fixed unit price. A certificate trading scheme implicates risks connected to both
electricity and certificate price levels.
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change process and promote renewable energy technologies with different maturity
levels”. The author further argues that the use of dynamic efficiency is a valu-
able tool in the evaluation of support policies and their design and shows how
dynamic efficiency dimensions can be used to assess design elements. Finon &
Menanteau (2003) compares the price-based feed-in tariff and the quantity-based
certificate scheme and shows that price-based approaches has a better track-record
for increasing installed capacity than the quantity-based3. This is explained by
the possibility of the tariffs being set higher than the renewable producer’s income
in the quantity-based scheme, and that the feed-in tariff gives stronger incentives
for investment through the guaranteed prices. According to the authors the price
guarantee makes the feed-in system more stable and hence more attractive to
investors. It is however also pointed out that the lacking control of production
quantity can make this an expensive solution for society. Verbruggen & Lauber
(2012) evaluates the two schemes according to four criterias; efficacy, efficiency,
equity and, institutional feasibility and concludes that well-designed feed-in tariff
schemes perform better than well-designed certificate schemes in every respect.
We present a simultaneous equilibrium model for electricity- and certificate price-
and quantity dynamics. Research on the field of price development in financial
instruments can be dated back as far as to Montgomery (1972), investigating the
existence of a market equilibrium price in emission licenses as a result of joint cost
minimization. Subsequent studies on this topic have turned in two main direc-
tions, the first of which uses stochastic descriptions of the price. This perspective
points out the existence of a martingale property in the price formation, as stated
in Seifert et al. (2008). Similar results are confirmed by Carmona et al. (2010)
who argues that the price at compliance must equal either the penalty or 0, and
hence that the price at any point in time must equal the discounted expected value
of the price at compliance. The statement that the certificate price depends on
the probability of a certain future outcome is also addressed by Chesney & Tas-
chini (2011). They consider the price dynamics of the emission certificates due to
asymmetric information where they prove the existence of a martingale condition
in the discounted price. Other studies supporting this approach are among others
Coulon et al. (2013).
The second direction of studies in the context of modelling price dynamics is in
close continuation with Montgomery’s work in describing the price formation as
an equilibrium formed through supply and demand. In electricity markets the
equilibrium mechanism is especially important, as electricity is difficult to store
3The authors however emphasize that conclusions were drawn based on limited data on the
GC market.
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and supply failure might be costly, indicating the existence of a market equilib-
rium price. We utilize this in our description of the electricity price formation,
continuing on the path trodden by amongst others Bye (2003). A price model
is developed from the supply and demand of both electricity and GCs, defining
the price movements by differentiating between electricity from traditional and
renewable technology. Other models based on the market equilibrium assump-
tion can be seen in Bessembinder & Lemmon (2002) and Borenstein & Bushnell
(1999) among others. Rubin (1996) extends Montgomery’s thoughts into a setting
which allows banking and borrowing of emission allowances. The author analyses
the inter-temporal effects of these opportunities and shows how they allow the
firms to control and adjust their stream of emissions through time. A central as-
sumption stated in this study is that the price of an emission allowance should
equal the marginal abatement cost of reducing emissions. A similar stand is taken
by Morthorst (2003) with respect to the GC market. Here it is concluded that
the sum of the electricity spot price and the GC price should equal the long run
marginal cost of investing in new renewable capacity4. This assumption is later
used in the development of our own model. Lemming (2003) presents the equilib-
rium pricing mechanism for a consumer-based GC market as a tool for analysing
a market where wind turbines is the only renewable energy production technology
available. Amundsen & Mortensen (2001) investigates the relationship between
green certificates and CO2 emission permits under the existence of price bounds
on the GCs through a static equilibrium model accounting for both instruments.
They find that stricter CO2 constraints as well as increased import wholesale price
may lead to reduced capacity for renewable energy production. They also find the
effects of increasing the GC quota to be inconclusive, however that the ratio of
renewable electricity relative to the total production will increase.
As we have shown, the illustration of the green certificate market in terms of an
equilibrium model, as known from basic microeconomics, is an already well ex-
plored field of study. However, the use of this method in combination with real
options theory is undocumented and is an interesting path to examine, both for
use in energy economics and in other areas. We use price data obtained from the
equilibrium model to describe an investment threshold for the stochastic invest-
ment cost through a real options framework. Dixit & Pindyck (1994) highlights
the value of real options theory in the valuation of projects and the opportunity to
invest and delay investment. In the examples presented in this work, the authors
4The basic principle from these results is consistent with the belief that a higher price would
incentivize companies with lower marginal abatement- or investment cost to exploit the price
difference. In general this way of describing the price dynamics simplifies the investment decision
as the investment will be favorable only if the marginal investment cost is below the long run
marginal cost and hence below the price.
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focus on the energy industry and the value of the option to delay investment. They
argue that for an irreversible investment, where the future returns are uncertain,
the optimal investment rule corresponds to when the expected value of postponing
the investment equals the expected value of investing now. The authors present
the real options approach as an alternative to the net present value (NPV) valu-
ation technique which is widely used, and how the introduction of irreversibility
introduces the need for modifying this approach. They argue that irreversibil-
ity introduces an opportunity cost to investing comprising of the potential value
of delaying the option to await further information about the market, that is, a
value of flexibility. The NPV valuation approach simply evaluates the sum of all
the discounted expected future cash flows less the investment cost, and hence do
not account for this value, which can lead the investor to make erroneous decisions.
Boomsma et al. (2012) compares the investment behavior following the certificate
and feed-in tariff schemes by considering several sources of uncertainty including
the probabilities of a change of support system. The findings show that the in-
vestor’s requirement for investing in terms of revenues is lower in the feed-in tariff
market than in the green certificate system, but also that the potential invest-
ment capacity is larger in favor of green certificates. Abadie & Chamorro (2005)
aims to derive the value of investment and the optimal investment rule for a nat-
ural gas-driven power plant where there exists an option to postpone investment.
Kumbarog˘lu et al. (2008) argues that the value of waiting becomes particularly
important in the case of assessing investment opportunities in renewable technolo-
gies, because of their modular properties, relatively short investment times, and
steep learning curves. According to the authors, the non-standard characteristics
of the electricity market5 calls for customizing of the applied theory and models.
When considering an investment opportunity in renewable energy technology through
the lenses of real options theory, the most explored factors of uncertainty are those
connected to the producer’s revenue, especially electricity prices and subsidy pay-
ments. Boomsma et al. (2012) consider these factors, but also looks at the option
value as a function of investment cost by considering steel prices as a stochastic
part of the total investment cost. It shows that uncertainty connected to costs can
be a major factor, a finding which is also illustrated in our paper where we define
a stochastically modelled investment cost as the source of uncertainty. Several
papers have pointed out the increased risk according to uncertainty in cost factors
and how this affects the optimal investment rule. Pindyck (1993) studies the effect
investment cost uncertainty has on irreversible investments. It considers two types
5Kumbarog˘lu et al. (2008) highlights among others time-variant price elasticities for energy
demand, non-linear cost structures and changes in construction lead times.
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of uncertainty over the cost of completion; technical- and price uncertainty. The
results show that both of these factors affect the decision rule remarkably, however
one positively and the other negatively6. Another paper considering the impact
of the cost uncertainty is Sarkar (2003). The scope of the author is to detect the
consequences of choosing GBM versus mean reversion as the stochastic process in
a real option investment analysis. By comparing the two different processes both
when the underlying is the investment’s revenue as well as when it is the costs,
he shows how the incentives for choosing the one over the other changes as the
underlying changes. His results confirm the importance of awareness of the source
of the investment’s uncertainty and the choice of the stochastic process this is
assumed to follow.
Sceptics to the green certificate scheme have argued that it causes increased volatil-
ity in the electricity price, as the prices of certificates, and hence also of electricity,
relies on volatile production volumes. Amundsen et al. (2006) points out that
the introduction of banking will reduce this volatility as well as contribute to an
increase in the social surplus7. The authors look at the sensitivity to shocks in
supply and demand in the GC market and state that banking indeed can counter-
act some of the price- and volume effects. Inspired by this we attempt to evaluate
the volatility-effects of the GC and feed-in tariff schemes, as well as the market
without a support scheme. This is done by evaluating the sensitivity of supply
and demand ”shocks” on the electricity- and certificate prices and on production
volumes. Lemming (2003) studies the effects that a consumer-based certificate
system will have on the financial risk taken by the investor of a wind-turbine. He
presents variations in the total supply due to the stochastic nature of wind to be
one of the main factors influencing the market equilibrium. The paper argues that
the revenue of the individual turbine-owner is a product of the negatively corre-
lated, and stochastic, production volume and certificate prices and points out that
this indicates that wind fluctuations will tend to decrease the short-term financial
risks. From this he draws the conclusion that certificate price fluctuations can in
fact be a desirable phenomenon.
As mentioned, the contribution of this paper is to introduce a framework for evalu-
ating an investment opportunity under investment cost-uncertainty given a simul-
taneous equilibrium in the electricity and green certificate markets. We evaluate
6Technical uncertainty is defined as uncertainty in amount of time, material and effort needed
to complete the project, which makes investing more attractive. Conversely, price uncertainty
represents the uncertainty in prices of needed material and labor in order to complete the in-
vestment, and increases the value of delaying to get more information.
7However, the article also argues that banking would decrease the average price, which is not
necessarily a positive development for the renewable energy producer.
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a wind power investment opportunity under a green certificate support scheme
where the investor holds a perpetual option to invest. In order to develop the op-
timal investment strategy, the value of the investment opportunity is hence derived
by combining market equilibrium- and real option theory. We find that the green
certificate scheme does indeed positively influence the ratio of renewable energy
relative to the total electricity supply. However, we also find that for reasonable
levels of the quota, this increase in renewable energy production capacity comes
at a price of an increased total energy consumption. When comparing the GC
scheme to its closest alternative, the feed in tariff, we find that the tariff induces
a larger increase in renewable production capacity, but also that GCs lead to a
larger reduction in the supply of non-renewable energy.
Further the paper is organized as follows; section 2 explains and presents the
mathematical equilibrium model, followed by the general model for the valuation
of the wind power investment. Section 3 presents results from the initial study
of the certificate model and a sensitivity analysis performed using these results.
In section 4 the GC system is compared to other market configurations, including
an analysis of the price, volume and volatility effects. Section 5 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Equilibrium and Real Option Investment Val-
uation
One of the main strengths of the GC scheme is that its financial instrument’s
price is constructed to follow the market mechanisms. Considering this property
we propose a simultaneous equilibrium model which takes into account both the
electricity- and the GC supply and demand. Combining this with a real options
model considering the wind park investment opportunity, we derive a model where
the market mechanisms are included in the investment decision. Compared to the
most commonly performed real option valuations the stochastic process is in our
case reversed as we assume the investment cost to be stochastic instead of the
project income.
The following expressions have been obtained based on a few general simplifica-
tions. Firstly, we regard the support scheme to be a permanent solution. In an
economic perspective permanent subsidy schemes are unfavorable, as the market
is more efficient when it is not controlled. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a
successful implementation of such a system in one country might lead to more na-
tions joining in on the same system, inducing changes in the initial setup leading
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to extensions of the original timeframe. This was observed in the Swedish GC sys-
tem where the timeframe was extended as a result of Norway joining the scheme.
Considering the possibility of a chain of such events over time we choose to model
the scheme as infinitely lived.
Secondly, the investment decision will be based on the assumption that all input
factors except the investment cost remain constant. The producers’ income from
the sale of electricity and GCs are, as stated above, assumed to be deterministic,
and the optimal investment rule is derived considering today’s price and income
level.
We also generally state that the investment can be delayed infinitely and without
cost, hence we ignore any possible expenses connected to expiration of concessions
or potential technology development negatively affecting the investment value.
However, we highlight the opportunity cost incurred by postponing the invest-
ment which comprises the cash flows the investor could have gained by immediate
investment8. Lastly we define the investment to be irreversible and we do not
consider shut-down or restart of the production plant as viable. In option the-
ory terms the investor holds a perpetual put option where he receives the strike,
comprising the sum of all future cash flows, by giving away the underlying, the
investment cost. When the option is not exercised, that is, when not investing,
the investor will pay a dividend by losing potential income, the opportunity cost.
The equilibrium expressions for both electricity and GCs are developed using the
Cobb-Douglas approach, and the model is later calibrated with respect to relevant
price data. Further we propose a real option modelling approach inspired by Dixit
& Pindyck (1994) where we consider the value of an investment opportunity in
a wind turbine park. The essential factors considered in this valuation are the
possible project incomes from sold electricity and GCs and the investment cost of
the project.
2.1 Equilibrium price models for electricity and certifi-
cates
The dynamics of the prices of both electricity and green certificates are described
by introducing an equilibrium market price model in line with the methodology of
Bye (2003). The price movements are assumed to follow the supply and demand
relationship directly, excluding the impact of any outside factors. For simplicity
8These opportunity costs are usually mainly comprised by lost potential income from product
sales less the variable production cost of said product.
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the market structure is assumed to consist of one representative producer and one
representative distributor where the producer sells electricity and GCs while the
distributor buys. The supply from the producer thus includes the supply from both
renewable and non-renewable technology, which introduces the need for separating
the supplied electricity into two groups9. We define electricity produced by non-
renewable technology as QNt , and electricity produced by renewable technology by
QRt . As the producer only receives certificates for renewable energy production,
the supply of GCs will equal the amount of electricity produced from renewable
technology10. The possibility of expansion in capacity is assumed to be unlimited
for both technologies. The renewable production technology is further assumed
to have a higher expansion cost per additional capacity than the non-renewable.
Since the main idea of the GC scheme is to induce investment where it is most
economically favorable, hence has the lowest investment cost per unit capacity
increased, we assume the investment cost for additional capacity to increase with
QRt . Further we also assume the sum of the electricity price and the GC price
to be high enough to make the production from renewable technology profitable.
Electricity is a homogeneous product, hence the consumer is indifferent to how it
is produced11, and pays the same price, pEt , regardless of whether it stems from
a renewable or non-renewable source. A system where both technologies are paid
equally for the electricity would however make an investment in renewable tech-
nology unfavorable as this is more expensive. In order to successfully incentivise
investment in renewable technology the combined price of electricity and certifi-
cate should cover the extra cost of expanding sufficient capacity to increase the
electricity production by one unit. Due to governmental restrictions the distribu-
tor must purchase GCs according to a percentage, α, of the total consumption of
electricity at a unit cost of pGCt . This results in a final purchaser price, p
D
t ;
pDt = p
E
t + αp
GC
t
A natural intuition is that this price will decrease as the share of renewable en-
ergy, α, in the total supply increases due to lower operational costs in renewable
technology.
9In the following these two groups can be seen as individual producers of energy from renew-
able and non-renewable sources respectively operating within the same firm. The firm, who at
any time possesses complete market supply information, will maximize its total profit, hence the
choice of production technology will not be influenced by speculation among the parties. In the
analyses presented in later sections, they will be referred to as the ”renewable producer” and the
”non-renewable producer” respectively.
10The producer receives one GC for each MWh electricity produced from renewable technology.
11We ignore any additional value purchasing only ”green” energy might give the consumer.
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Electricity equilibrium As previously stated, the total amount of energy sup-
plied by the producer is composed of both renewable and non-renewable electricity,
hence the total supply of electricity is;
QSt = Q
R
t +Q
N
t
On the demand side, the distributor seeks to maximize utility less the cost of
purchasing electricity;
max U(QDt )− pDt QDt
These supply and demand functions result in the following initial equilibrium ex-
pression;
QRt +Q
N
t = Q
D
t
Naturally, the demand of energy distributor will rely on the purchaser price, hence
we write;
QDt = f(p
D
t ) = f(p
E
t + αp
GC
t )
Certificate equilibrium When not considering the subject of banking of cer-
tificates for future use, the total supply of certificates, SGC , equals the total supply
of energy from renewable energy sources12;
SGC = QRt
The demand for certificates is strongly linked to the total amount of demanded
electricity through the governmentally controlled quota;
DGC = αQDt
Hence, the equilibrium for green certificates can be presented as;
QRt = αQ
D
t
Developing expressions using Cobb-Douglas The Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tion is used for deriving the functions of the supply and demand. We define the
expression for electricity demand as
QDt = C
D(pEt + αp
GC
t )
ε
12Assuming all electricity characterized as ”renewable” is engaged in the certificate scheme.
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Where CD is a calibration coefficient securing the caption of the individual mar-
ket’s demand behavior and ε represents the demand elasticity. The electricity
supply is composed of separate specifications for the renewable and non-renewable
production;
QSt = C
N(pEt )
κN + CR(pEt + p
GC
t )
κR − ξ
Where CN and CR are the calibration coefficients of the supply side components.
κN and κR are the elasticities of renewable and non-renewable supply respectively,
and ξ is the intercept for the renewable energy technology. This intercept rep-
resents the total market supply at the renewable producer’s zero supply point,
indicating the production quantity at which the equilibrium price sufficiently high
to renewable production profitable. It is a result of the high market entry barrier
for renewable technology, mainly explained by the substantial fixed costs. Since
the supply of renewable energy is perfectly correlated in a 1:1 relationship with the
supply of GCs the expressions for renewable energy supply and certificates are in-
terchangeable. In the following we refer to the renewable elasticity and calibration
coefficient as κGC and CGC in order the ease the intuitive understanding of the
parameters. With this notation the expression for the electricity supply becomes;
QSt = C
N(pEt )
κN + CGC(pEt + p
GC
t )
κGC − ξ
This results in an equilibrium equation for electricity equal to;
CN(pEt )
κN + CGC(pEt + p
GC
t )
κGC − ξ = CD(pEt + αpGCt )ε (1)
Since the demand for GCs is governmentally regulated through the required quota,
which is a fraction of the electricity demand, the GC demand will also be a fraction
of the electricity demand;
QGCt = αQ
D
t = αC
D(pEt + αp
GC
t )
ε
The supply of GCs is as explained given by the supply of renewable energy;
QGCt = C
GC(pEt + p
GC
t )
κGC
As this will serve a share equal to α of the total market demand, the rest, 1−α, will
be supplied by the nonrenewable producer. This results in the following market
equilibrium equations;
CGC(pEt + p
GC
t )
κGC − ξ = αCD(pEt + αpGCt )ε (2)
CN(pEt )
κN = (1− α)CD(pEt + αpGCt )ε (3)
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2.2 Stochastic processes – Mean Reversion
As mentioned, we model the construction costs as being the source of uncertainty.
When investing in a wind turbine park the majority of the costs are related to the
actual construction of the wind turbines. Modern turbines are mainly constructed
from steel which indicates that changes in the investment cost are predominantly
a product of fluctuations in the steel price13. Describing the appropriate process
for modelling the price development in commodity prices have been the scope of
several studies. One of the pioneering analyses on this topic is done by Schwartz
(1997), where three different models are developed with the intention of verifying
the mean reverting tendencies in commodity prices. This article makes out some
of the foundation for our choice of modelling the steel price as a mean reverting
process. Additionally, a more recent study; Ozorio et al. (2012) finds that as well
as being led by a mean reverting component, the steel prices might have a rising
drift component. We assume the steel price to be following a simple Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck mean reverting process;
dXt = η(X¯ −Xt)Xtdt+ σXtdz (4)
Here Xt is the steel price at time t, η is the speed of reversion, X¯ is the level to
which X tends to revert and σ is the short-term volatility.
2.3 Valuation
In order to define the optimal investment timing the investment opportunity is
evaluated using real options theory. As explained above the investment cost repre-
sents the stochastic factor while the potential income is determined by the equilib-
rium model. We start by defining the value of the investment opportunity based
on the investment cost, and then combining this with the equilibrium model in
a value matching constraint to obtain the optimal investment rule deciding the
investor’s behavior as a function of the investment cost.
At any time, the value of the investment opportunity is constructed by the choice
between two alternatives; investing today or delaying the investment for an ad-
ditional period. This value will be denoted F (X) and the objective is to find an
investment rule which maximizes this value. The stochastic process is in our case
reversed compared to the most commonly performed real option valuation as we
assume the investment cost to be stochastic instead of the project income.
13We here abstract from any cost due to acquisitions of land and subsequently required ad-
justment for further use.
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The mean-reverting process has a non-constant growth rate leading to a non-
constant risk-adjusted discount rate, µ. We therefore choose to utilize the con-
tingent claims approach, as opposed to dynamic programming, as this allows us
to use market principles to define the discount rate rather than specifying it as a
fixed constant.
Contingent claims requires the existence of assets which individually or combined
can perfectly span the stochastic changes in X through a replicating portfolio.
Assuming that spanning holds, the replicating portfolio is constructed by;
1. Holding the option to invest with value F (X)
2. Shorting n = F ′(X)14 units of the asset which is perfectly correlated with X
3. The short position demands an obligation of paying the shorted asset’s div-
idend, δF ′(X)X, to the owner
The total value of this portfolio over the time period dt is;
dF − F ′(X)dX − δXF ′(X)dt (5)
Since F (X) is a function of X which is assumed to follow a stochastic mean-
reverting process, we can apply Ito’s Lemma to obtain an expression for dF ;
dF = F ′(X)dX +
1
2
F ′′(X)(dX)2
From equation (4) we can derive the expression for (dX)2 and by eliminating any
higher degrees of dt, as these approaches zero faster than dt, we get;
(dX)2 = σ2X2dt
Inserting the expressions for dF and (dX)2 in equation (5) we get that the total
value of the portfolio can be expressed as;
1
2
F ′′(X)σ2X2dt− δXF ′(X)dt
14This exact amount is chosen in order to make the portfolio risk free.
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From the expression in equation (4) we see that the expected rate of growth of
X, α = η(X¯ − Xt), is not constant, but rather a function of X. This leads to a
dividend rate which is also dependent on X15:
δ(Xt) = µ− α = µ− η(X¯ −Xt)
Inserting this expression for δ, the final expression for the portfolio’s return is;
1
2
σ2X2F ′′(X)dt− [µ− η(X¯ −X)]XF ′(X)dt
Since this is a risk-free portfolio it should earn the risk-free interest rate on the
amount invested;
1
2
σ2X2F ′′(X)dt− [µ− η(X¯ −X)]XF ′(X)dt = r[F − F ′(X)X]dt
Dividing by dt and rearranging;
1
2
σ2X2F ′′(X) +
[
r − µ+ η(X¯ −X)]XF ′(X)− rF = 0 (6)
Which is a differential stochastic equation of second order.
Boundary Conditions In order to find the investment cost which makes it
optimal to exercise the option, here noted X∗, we need boundary conditions related
to the stochastic differential equation. We start by stating that if the investment
cost, X, is very large then the probability for it to drop to a level where we would
invest is very small, resulting in the condition;
lim
x→∞
F (X) = 0 (7)
Further we establish the value matching relationship stating that at the optimal
investment time the value of the option and the net value obtained by exercising
it16 should be equal. The future cash flow is determined by the equilibrium model
explained above and the stochastic investment cost by the mean reverting process.
The present value of the total future revenue, V , is computed as the sum of the
discounted future cash flows of electricity produced17. The risk adjusted discount
rates of the electricity and the GC price are represented by µE and µGC respectively.
15For a thorough explanation see Dixit & Pindyck (1994).
16The value at exercise is defined as the NPV of the future income less the investment cost.
17Assuming that all produced electricity and GCs are sold.
16
Further we assume no operating cost for the wind turbine. This gives the expres-
sion for the value matching condition;
F (X∗) = V (pE, pGC)− cX∗ = p
E
µE
+
pGC
µGC
− cX∗ (8)
Here c is the amount of steel necessary to produce one unit of electricity yearly. As
equation (8) depends on the optimal investment cost, X∗, which is an uncertain
value, we need another condition in order to solve the second order differential
equation. We utilize the smooth pasting condition which defines the investment
cost to be continuous in the optimal value, X∗. Hence we require the property;
F ′(X∗) = −c (9)
Optimal Solution Due to the nature of the differential equation we need to
introduce another function, h(X), in order to find an appropriate solution;
F (X) = AXθh(X) (10)
Here A and θ are constants to be defined for F (X) to satisfy the differential
equation. Inserting equation (10) into equation (6) and rearranging we get;
Xθh(X)
[
1
2
σ2θ (θ − 1) + (r − µ+ ηX¯) θ − r]
+Xθ+1
[
1
2
σ2Xh′′(X) +
(
σ2θ + r − µ+ ηX¯ − ηX)h′(X)− ηθh(X)] = 0 (11)
In order for this equation to hold both the bracketed terms must equal zero. For
the first bracket this implies;
1
2
σ2θ (θ − 1) + (r − µ+ ηX¯) θ − r = 0
This equation has two solutions, but to fulfill the boundary condition in equation
(7) only the negative solution can be feasible:
θ =
1
2
+
(
µ− r − ηX¯) /σ2 −
√[(
r − µ+ ηX¯) /σ2 − 1
2
]2
+ 2r/σ2 (12)
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Letting the second bracketed term equal zero;
1
2
σ2Xh′′(X) +
(
σ2θ + r − µ+ ηX¯ − ηX)h′(X)− ηθh(X) = 0 (13)
Performing the substitution z = 2ηX/σ2 equation (13) can be transformed to a
standard form where we further can let h(X) = g(z) so that h′(X) = (2η/σ2)g′(z)
and h′′(X) = (2η/σ2)g′′(z). This allows equation (13) to be written as;
zg′′(z) + (b− z)g′(z)− θg(z) = 0 (14)
where
b = 2θ + 2(r − µ+ ηX¯)/σ2
This is known as the Kummer’s Equation which has two confluent hypergeometric
functions, H(z; θ, b) and U(z; θ, b)18, as its solutions. The first solution, H(z; θ, b)
can be represented by the following series;
H(z; θ, b) = 1 +
θ
b
z +
θ(θ + 1)
b(b+ 1)
z2
2!
+
θ(θ + 1)(θ + 2)
b(b+ 1)(b+ 2)
z3
3!
+ ... (15)
The second solution U(z; θ, b) takes the form;
U(z; θ, b) =
Γ(1− b)
Γ(θ − b+ 1)H(z; θ, b) +
Γ(b− 1)
Γ(θ)
z1−bH(z; θ − b+ 1, 2− θ) (16)
This verifies that the solution of equation (6) has the form of equation (10) and
can be redefined to either;
F (X) = AXθH
(
2η
σ2
X; θ, b
)
(17)
or
F (X) = AXθU
(
2η
σ2
X; θ, b
)
(18)
where A and the critical value of X, X∗, can be determined from the remain-
ing boundary conditions (8) and (9). Since the solution consists of a confluent
hypergeometric function which is an infinite series, A and X∗ have to be found
18H(z; θ, b) is known as the Kummer’s function of first kind, whereas U(z; θ, b) is known as
the Kummer’s function of second kind or the Tricomi function.
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numerically. We find that the first kind of Kummer’s function does not satisfy the
boundary condition in equation (7). The second kind of Kummer’s function on
the other hand is found to comply all the boundary conditions and possesses the
appropriate properties, hence the final solution equals equation (18).
2.4 Equilibrium expressions adjusted for other policy sys-
tems
In order to gain more information about the GC policy efficiency we want to
compare the GC results with a feed-in tariff system and a market without any
subsidies. Deriving expressions for these policies requires some minor adjustments
in the model’s calculations of the future total revenue.
Feed-in tariff Huisman et al. (2013) describes a feed-in tariff system where the
government guarantees a per kWh electricity price for the renewable producer and
compensates for the difference should the prevailing electricity price be below this
level. Hence, the firm’s income per unit sold is fixed through a long term contract.
We adjust our GC model to fit with this arrangement. As it in this case exists only
one tradable commodity we operate with a single equilibrium equation. Taking
this into account, we define the electricity supply function as;
QSt = C
N(pEt )
κN + CGC(L)κGC − ξ
where L is the guaranteed price and hence is comprised by the electricity price,
pE and the amount compensated by the government, l = L − pE. Since the
distributor only have to pay for the electricity, not both electricity and GC, the
electricity demand only depends on the electricity price, pEt . Hence the electricity
demand can be expressed by;
QDt = C
D(pEt )
ε
This gives the final equilibrium for the feed-in tariff market;
CN(pEt )
κN + CGC(L)κGC − ξ = CD(pEt )ε (19)
Market without applied subsidies In a market without financial support
schemes the possible future cash flow for a wind park investor consists solely of
the revenue from the sold electricity. This price is defined by the electricity supply
and demand equilibrium in equation (1) where pGCt = 0. Hence we have
CN(pEt )
κN + CGC(pEt )
κGC − ξ = CD(pEt )ε (20)
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3 Results from the Green Certificate Model
We perform a case study of the Swedish/Norwegian market, and make use of sam-
ple data from this market for the calibration19. The calibration procedure and
resulting coefficients can be seen in Appendix A. After illustrating the effects of
varying the market’s sensitivity to changes in the price, a set of final properties
seen as the most likely and representative for this specific market is defined as a
base-case providing the foundation for further analysis.
Through setting the quota the government has a tool for controlling the demand of
renewable electricity. As the level chosen also decides the allocation of the market
revenues, α is seen as one of the most crucial factors affecting the GC scheme’s
efficiency. This value is assumed to remain constant once set when regarding the
optimal investment decision. However, its effect on the equilibrium prices of elec-
tricity and green certificates makes its influence on the outcome of the real option
analysis quite substantial. For this reason, we highlight the effects of a change
in the quota. Bye (2003) presents a series of analyses used to display the effects
of changes in α on the equilibrium prices of a hypothetical market. More than a
decade later we apply actual data from the Swedish/Norwegian market to perform
similar calculations and further evaluate the subject.
3.1 Price and quantity effects of varying elasticities and
quota
To display the effects of the choice of market properties on the results, we inves-
tigate a selection of hypothetical configurations of the market features, seen in
table 1. The cases are comprised of different combinations of supply- and demand
elasticities, and are evaluated for varying levels of α to display the changing price
dynamics.
As can be seen in the table, the demand elasticity has in all cases been set to a
quite small and negative value. The demand is prone to decline as the purchaser
price increases, as a result of increasing electricity- or certificate price, making a
negative elasticity value a natural assumption. Electricity is a quite fundamental
good in today’s society, hence a valid assumption is that the average consumption
remains quite stable even when the prices change20. For this reason, most of the
19We use monthly data from NordPool and NECS on the Swedish market on electricity- and
GC prices dating from 2004–2013. As data on the Norwegian market is still highly limited, we
used the Swedish data as representative for the Swedish/Norwegian market.
20Even if the purchaser price of energy increases drastically society relies on electricity to
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cases evaluates a demand elasticity as low as 0.1, however we also explore the price
reactions to higher and lower values21. It can be argued that this value is too low,
as the model does not account for the possibility of import and export of energy
to external markets. The Swedish/Norwegian market evaluated in our analysis is
completely self-sufficient, that is, all energy supplied during a period is purchased
and used within this market. The model also assumes instantaneous equilibrium
at all times, no storage of either electricity or certificates is incorporated. In the
real world, the possibility of both international trading and banking of certificates
lowers the occasional gap, mostly due to seasonal variations, between supply and
demand. As for the supply elasticities, several combinations are examined. Based
on the same reasoning as for the demand elasticity, quite low supply elasticities
are expected to best represent reality. We have also included scenarios showing
more extreme values for both κGC and κN .
Table 1: Alternative combinations of elasticities for the demand and supply under the
GC scheme
Alternatives Supply elasticity Demand elasticity
κGC κN ε
02–02–01 0.2 0.2 –0.1
02–08–01 0.2 0.8 –0.1
09–01–01 0.9 0.1 –0.1
02–02–03 0.2 0.2 –0.3
02–02–005 0.2 0.2 –0.05
Based on the discussion above and also highlighting the limited availability of
substitutes for electricity, which argues for low demand elasticity, we choose the
first case, (02–02–01), combined with a quota-level of 0.07 as the normal level
which will be used as the GC market base-case. This configuration is considered
the most realistic scenario, and will later be used in the comparison of the GC
scheme with other alternative support schemes and in the analysis of the optimal
investment rule.
function and will keep using electricity practically regardless of cost. As prices decrease, the
consumption might slightly rise, however the average consumption is assumed quite stable also
in this case.
21Bye (2003) presents articles, e.g. Johnsen (2001), in which this value has been estimated to
lie close to 0.1 in reality. In an analysis of the Norwegian market from 1996–2010 Holstad &
Pettersen (2011) even suggest electricity demand elasticities as low as –0.05.
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Figure 1: Total purchaser price for the different combinations of elasticities as a function
of increasing α
Equilibrium price variations according to varying α Figure 1 shows the
total purchaser price, pDt , as seen by the distributor as a function of varying quota,
α, for each of the discussed elasticity scenarios. The figure indicates that varying
α causes similar changes in the total purchaser price in all of the evaluated cases.
A growing α results in replacing nonrenewable production with renewable. As
long as the set α is below a certain level, increasing it has a negative effect on the
purchaser price, whereas for an α above, the effect is positive22. This is a result of
the electricity price, pE, decreasing more rapidly than the expenses following the
purchase of GCs, αpGC , increases. Conversely, for αs greater than this level, αpGC
increases more rapidly than the pE decrease, hence we see an increasing purchaser
price.
Both in the (02–02–03) and the (09–01–01) cases, that is, the high ε- and κR-cases,
the purchaser price follows a less steep slope than in the other cases. With a higher
demand elasticity, this is a result of the purchaser’s unwillingness to pay higher
prices which restricts the increase in the price level. For the high κGC case we see
that as α increases the renewable producer’s revenue as the buyers are obligated to
purchase more GCs. Because of the renewable supply’s high price responsiveness,
the renewable supply increases sharply as the price increases, inducing a decrease
in the purchaser price. An interesting observation can be seen in case (02–08–01),
where the nonrenewable elasticity is high. As α increases this case starts develop-
ing paralell to the lower κN case. The effect of the high κN hence diminishes as
the share of non-renewable energy supply is dominated by the renewable share.
22The purchaser-price-minimizing α varies among the elasticity-configurations.
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Figure 2: Total producer income as the sum of electricity and certificate price for varying
the quota, α
Figure 2 illustrates the development in the income of the producer from renewable
sources and its individual components, pE and pGC . As can be expected, the total
income increases as the quota increases, as well as pGC . Another confirmation of
the model’s ability to correctly describe the market dynamics is the decreasing
electricity price. A reason for this reaction in pE is the increased total supply
combined with the decreasing demand for nonrenewable energy. The nonrenewable
producer this way contributes in the financing of the renewable production.
Supply variations according to changing α The fact that the purchaser
price declines until a certain level of α, is in line with the findings of Bye (2003),
who also argues that this indeed will lead to a higher share of renewable energy
in the market. However, it is also suggested that the slope of the decreasing price
faced by the consumer will lead to a higher total consumption of electricity. This
result can in fact be seen in figure 3b where the total supply increases as long as
the quota is held below 0.2. Jensen & Skytte (2002) points out that managing the
GC scheme might be difficult if its introduction has both the target of increas-
ing renewable supply as well as reducing total electricity consumption. In our
case, the only way to satisfy both targets, would be to set the quota substantially
higher than 0.2. The goal of reducing total consumption is mainly grounded in
that increased consumption will increase emission. This will however not apply in
this specific situation concerning the Swedish/Norwegian market as most of the
production plants which are not qualified for receiving GCs are older hydropower
plants which do not produce emissions.
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(a) Green energy supply for varying α (b) Total electricity supply for varying α
Figure 3: Supply in the GC scheme when the required quota increases
Variation in optimal investment rule according to varying α Though the
effect α has on the purchaser price is limited as long as the α is maintained at a
lower level, it still has a crucial role in allocating the revenues between renewable
and non-renewable electricity producers. We want to investigate how the level of
the quota influences the optimal investment timing in the wind park and the prob-
ability of this investment taking place within the next two years. Studying the
combinations of base-case elasticity values and αs of 0.02, 0.07 and 0.15, which are
valid values for the Swedish/Norwegian system, we find the optimal investment
cost by solving equation (18) for X constrained by the boundary conditions in
equations (8) and (9). The average level to which the investment cost is assumed
to revert, X¯, is set equal to 2. Further the amount of steel necessary to produce
one unit of electricity, c, is set equal to 1.523. Not surprisingly, it is optimal to
invest sooner as the quota, and hence the future cash flow, rises. The probability
of exercising the option to invest within the next two years can be seen in table 2.
The probabilities are calculated using the method described in AppendixB.
Table 2: The probability of investing within the next two years for different required
quotas, α, for GC base-case elasticity values
Level Quota α = 0.02 α = 0.07 α = 0.15
Pr(X < X∗) 10.26% 17.60% 37.13%
23Since the main purpose is to demonstrate the effect on X∗ when α changes rather than the
actual cost when investment is optimal, the value of X¯ and c are set to make a realistic ratio
between the revenues and the cost.
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In figure 4 the optimal investment rule is demonstrated in terms of the option
value versus the intrinsic value of investing today. Here the optimal investment
is defined by the investment cost being at the level where the option value equals
the intrinsic value, hence where the value of postponing the investment is the
same as the value of investing in the wind park today. Remembering that we are
considering a put option, the results from figure 4 shows that when α = 0.15 the
investor would exercise when the investment cost lies just below the average level,
X¯. We see that as α decreases, the level at which the cost must fall to for the
investor to exercise decreases. Hence he invests sooner at high αs than when α
is lower, as displayed by the probabilities in table 2. This confirms our natural
intuition and the GC scheme fulfills its purpose; the higher the α, the higher are
the investor’s incentives to invest in renewable technology.
Figure 4: Option value for varying quota versus the intrinsic value, V − cX, in each case
3.2 Supply and demand equilibrium – GC base case
In an equilibrium model, changing one factor has consequences for the other vari-
ables. In the equilibrium model explained above both the electricity and the GC
price are variables and the purchaser price is a function of these two and the
set level of the quota. In order to find the equilibrium values for the prices and
the quantity of sold electricity, the base-case properties in table 3 are used when
solving the equations for the electricity demand and total supply for varying pEt
and pGCt . The result can be seen in figure 5. Here it can be observed that the
quantity of electricity in the equilibrium will remain stable while the prices vary.
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This implies that the purchaser price remains practically constant as a result of
pE and αpGC being negatively correlated. In the price combinations where both
prices approaches zero the demand increases strongly, whereas it remains stable for
increasing prices. This result is caused by the electricity being considered a fun-
damental good in today’s society, hence that consumers are willing to pay almost
any price for electricity.
Table 3: Base-case properties for the Swedish/Norwegian GC market
Market Property κGC κN ε ξ α
0.2 0.2 −0.1 122.5 0.07
Figure 5: Base-case electricity supply and demand with varying electricity and GC
prices. The equilibrium demonstrates an approximately constant traded quantity
If we optimize the equilibrium equations (2) and (3) with respect to the input
price data we find the prices to be as shown in table 4. With these prices the
renewable supply can be calculated to be 8.5175 TWh, as shown in table 5, and
also confirmed in figure 3a. Table 5 also presents the renewable-to-total supply
ratio, which in a green certificate market should be equal to the quota. This theory
does indeed correspond to our findings.
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Table 4: Electricity and certificate prices in GC scheme base-case
Price pE pGC
[øre/kWh] 26.7971 19.6934
Table 5: Production allocation for market applying the green certificate scheme
Production Total Supply Non-renewable Renewable Renewable Ratio
[TWh] 121.6791 113.1616 8.5175 0.0700
4 Policy Comparison
The green certificate scheme is only one of a broad selection of regulatory tools
authorities can apply to stimulate investment in renewable energy facilities. As
mentioned above policy choice and design is an already thoroughly discussed topic
with highly divergent conclusions. The alternative which in design bears the clos-
est resemblance to the certificate scheme can be said to be the feed-in tariff system.
For this reason it has been chosen as the best benchmark in order to illustrate the
properties of the green certificate scheme with respect to efficiency and ability to
successfully induce investment. We also compare our results to the case of no
applied support scheme in order to better demonstrate the general effects of such
a scheme.
Considering the investment opportunity under these different systems, the most
influential factor is the possible revenue of the investor, comprising the income from
sale of electricity, as a function of pE, and from the potential support scheme. We
present an analysis on how the different systems and hence the change in future
revenue affects the investor’s behavior and the optimal investment rule. As there
are infinitely many configurations to be chosen for the feed-in tariff, we have,
as with the GC scheme, chosen a single representative base case for its market
properties as the basis of comparison. The representative configuration chosen
for the GC-system has already been presented as the (02–02–01) case with an α
of 0.07 and has been thoroughly described above. The main focus is set on the
development of the supply of renewable energy and the reduction of non-renewable
energy production. We evaluate the dynamics of the electricity price and producer
revenues and also consider specific scenarios introducing shocks in supply and
demand. The potential consequences in the shape of changes in the market’s price-
responsiveness are studied and compared. It is important to note that variables
considered being market properties are held identical when describing the base-
cases of each system. This is done to secure the comparison to be performed based
on the same core conditions for all schemes considered. Hence, the supply and
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demand price-elasticities, κR, κN and ε, the calibration constants, CN , CGC and
CD, as well as the intercept, ξ, are kept the same in all schemes
24. Most of the
input parameters in the base-case of the feed-in tariff are therefore identical to the
GC scheme, with the exception of α, which is replaced by a compensation level,
L, to be described below. For the case of no support scheme the only difference
from the GC scheme is the absence of pGC and α.
4.1 Feed-in tariff comparison
Under the feed-in tariff scheme the producer of energy from renewable sources
receives a fixed compensation, L, per unit of electricity, through long term con-
tracts25. This guaranteed revenue relieves the renewable producer from any price
risk, and the level of production from renewable energy sources is hence inelastic
to changes in the electricity market price. This dynamic is displayed by replacing
the equilibrium equation in the original model with equation (19) as explained
above.
In the same way as the output from the green certificate expressions is assumed to
be, to a significant extent, defined by the quota, the most influential factor for the
outcome of the feed-in equilibrium equations is assumed to be the compensation
level. In order to set L to a relevant and comparable level relative to the GC
scheme, we utilize a price-based approach26 for obtaining the optimal comparison
basis. The fixed compensation in the feed in base-case is here set to equal the
average level of total revenues for the renewable producer in the GC scheme. To
achieve this we use the GC model’s input price data and set L equal to the av-
erage sum of the electricity and the GC price. This results in a L = 52.59 øre/kWh.
An interesting feature of comparison against the GC-scheme is the level of sup-
ply from renewable energy sources and the rate at which it changes according to
defining factors like the level of L. As can be seen from figure 6b and table 6,
the level of supply is higher for the feed-in tariff base-case with a value of 11.79
TWh, than for the GC system, which gives a production of 8.52 TWh. This can
be seen as a result of the systems’ fundamental differences; where feed-in controls
the price, the GC scheme controls the desired renewable supply. This indicates
that the compensation level set in the feed-in scheme provides financing for more
expensive renewable technology than what the efficient market in the GC scheme
24The coefficients are presented in Appendix A.
25In the following derivations these contracts will be seen as perpetual.
26As opposed to a quantity-based approach which aims to force equal production quantities
in both systems. This would require choosing a compensation level in the feed-in tariff system
which provides the same amount of renewable supply as the chosen α provides in the GC scheme.
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(a) Development in the equilibrium electricity price as the renewable producer’s guar-
anteed price, L, increases
(b) Equilibrium supply of total, renewable and nonrenewable electricity as a function of
increasing compensation level, L
Figure 6: Equilibrium electricity price and supply for feed-in tariff for varying compen-
sation level, L
is willing to pay for. As a consequence, the total electricity supply in the feed-in
tariff system is substantially higher than in the GC system with 123.23 TWh ver-
sus 121.68 TWh.
Another interesting comparison is the different schemes’ efficiency in reducing emis-
sion by making production from nonrenewable technology less attractive. The
defining factor of the profitability for the nonrenewable producer is the electricity
price. Figure 6a shows the negative development in the market electricity price for
increasing compensation levels. We stress that this market electricity price does
not include any financing of the fixed subsidy paid to the renewable producer, as
this is externally compensated by the government. Comparing figure 6b show-
ing the supply development for increasing L to figure 3b, we see that the feed-in
performs poorly compared to the GC in terms of reducing non-renewable supply.
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Table 6: Supply allocation for market applying the feed-in tariff scheme.
Production Total Supply Non-renewable Renewable Renewable Ratio
[TWh] 123.23 111.44 11.79 0.096
For an α = 0.15, which is a highly plausible scenario, the GC system reduces
non-renewable supply by around 17%. For the feed-in tariff to result in the same
reduction in non-renewable supply, the government would need to impose a fixed
price of around 100 øre/kWh, which is an unlikely level to ever approach.
Figure 7: Supply and demand equilibrium in the feed-in tariff scheme for L = 52.59
øre/kWh
From the seen results the feed-in tariff system with a base-case compensation level
of 52.59 øre/kWh is more effective in increasing the share of renewable supply
than the GC base-case scenario. This is in compliance with the findings of Finon
& Menanteau (2003) who argue that the feed-in tariff is more efficient in inducing
investment. In terms of reducing emissions the GC scheme however redeems itself
slightly by showing higher efficiency, especially when α is set at a slightly higher
level than in our base-case. To remove the ambiguity of the results, the social
cost of the support scheme should be assessed in order to make a balanced state-
ment on the schemes’ efficiency. The GC system is constructed in such a way that
the subsidies assigned to the renewable producer are dynamically controlled by
the market. This results in an economically efficient financing instrument where
the subsidies just cover the marginal costs, leaving the producer with little or no
surplus. In the feed-in tariff system the price received by the renewable producer
is a fixed amount, while the subsidy paid by the government varies with pE. As
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L is normally set to a higher level than the producer’s marginal cost, the total
cost of the feed-in scheme is higher than for the GC. On the other hand, Finon &
Menanteau (2003) claims that this gap allows for more R&D activity.
4.2 No support scheme
We also consider the investment opportunity under a scheme with no subsidies.
Given this setting, we replace equation (1) with equation (20) in the equilibrium
model.
(a) Supply- and demand-curves for no
scheme applied
(b) Renewable supply-curve for no
scheme applied
Figure 8: Market equilibrium and renewable production development in a no-support
market
The solution of the no support base-case27 gives a supply-demand equilibrium
where the traded quantity is 119.38 TWh, as can be seen in table 7, and the
electricity price is 34.1 øre/kWh, as displyed in figure 8a. According to Finon &
Menanteau (2003) the low renewable supply is a result of the technology not being
mature enough to compete on profitability with the nonrenewable sources. An
investment in these sources is less expensive while also contributing with a more
stable supply flow. We also note that, as expected, the ratio of renewable supply is
significantly lower when no support is applied, as the investor chooses the cheaper
non-renewable technologies.
27As mentioned the no scheme base-case operates with the same elasticities and coefficients as
the GC scheme.
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Table 7: Production allocation for a market without support scheme
Production Total Supply Non-renewable Renewable Renewable Ratio
[TWh] 119.38 118.74 0.64 0.0053
4.3 Investment decision under different schemes
As already stated, the main purpose of green certificates is to induce investment
in renewable technology with the objective of increasing the total renewable en-
ergy supply. We are therefore interested in comparing the GC system’s ability
to boost the investment rate in renewable technology compared to the alternative
schemes28. We consider the wind turbine investment opportunity described ear-
lier. By using the output prices from the supply-demand equilibrium equations
we compare the GC scheme with the feed-in tariff and no support scheme through
the real option model from section 2.3.
Table 8: The probability of investing within the next two years for the different support
scheme base-cases
Support Scheme GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
Pr(X < X∗) 17.60% 22.99% 8.62%
All input parameters in the real option model are held constant except the in-
vestment’s possible income according to the individual scheme29. We solve the
real option model for the optimal investment cost, X∗, in each alternative and
calculate the probability of investment within the next two years, as displayed in
table 8. These results are demonstrated graphically in figure 9 where the project
value under each scheme is drawn against its intrinsic value. The results show, as
expected, that the investor will wait the longest with investing in a market with
no active support system. In the feed-in base-case the investor would exercise his
investment option sooner than under the GC scheme base-case. This is in compli-
ance with the results presented in Boomsma et al. (2012). A valid explanation to
this is that the feed-in tariff scheme allocates the benefit entirely to the producer,
and hence to the investor, whereas in the GC scheme this benefit is assigned the
28We hence look at the schemes efficiency in leading to higher probabilities of investment at
any given level of X0.
29One could argue that the required rate of return and hence the discount factors for each
scheme should be differentiated according to the schemes’ varying risk profiles. A valid assump-
tion might be that an investor under the feed-in tariff system would require a lower rate of
return as the guaranteed price eliminates some of the investment’s risk. This is an interesting
perspective, but it falls beyond the scope of this paper.
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consumer30. Summarized the results imply that, between the alternatives, the
feed-in scheme induces investment earlier than the GC scheme.
Figure 9: Base-case option value in the different support schemes versus the intrinsic
value, V − cX, in each case
4.4 Uncertainty in renewable energy production
An important aspect to consider when evaluating the efficiency and potential con-
tribution of a support scheme, is the risk taken by the individual market actors
and the vulnerability of their revenues to unstable production levels. Renewable
technology is especially exposed to this kind of uncertainty as its energy source
mainly depends on uncontrollable weather conditions. This risk does not only
apply to the renewable energy producers, but also to the market as a whole de-
pending on its sensitivity to changes in supply. Considering a sudden change in
the production conditions for the renewable energy sources, we investigate the ef-
fect this kind of ”shock” has on the market for each evaluated support scheme.
We consider the sensitivity in the different schemes to the changes in renewable
production in the market and investigate the consequences this has for a potential
wind park investor.
30As the purchaser price decreases in the relevant range of quotas, as shown in figure 1.
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Supply shock We start by assuming that the total amount of renewable sup-
ply in the market originates from wind turbines. Further the number of yearly
effective production hours is assumed to be 3000 per year. We evaluate the ef-
fects of increasing or decreasing this by 10 hours, or 0.33%, representing positive
and negative ”shocks” in the renewable supply. These are very modest changes,
but as is shown in table 9 it results in substantial changes in both price and supply.
Table 9: Relative changes in electricity price pE , certificate price pGC , purchaser price
pD and total electricity production Qtotal for a 10 hour increase and decrease in effective
production time for the renewable energy technology
Positive shock GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
∆pGC – 99.7% – –
∆pE + 1.68% – 0.11% – 0.006%
∆Qtotal + 0.29% – 0.05% – 0.003%
∆pD – 3.3% – –
Negative shock
∆pGC + 102.1% – –
∆pE – 1.66% + 0.11% + 0.006%
∆Qtotal – 0.34% – 0.011% – 0.0006%
∆pD + 3.4% – –
As can be seen, the market’s reactions to positive and negative supply shocks are
almost perfectly negatively correlated. We therefore only evaluate the results from
the positive ”shock”. The effects are by far the most significant in the GC scheme,
where the price of certificates plummets while the electricity price rises slightly.
This results in a negative development in the purchaser price, which in turn in-
creases total demand and hence total supply. Quite surprisingly, we observe an
increase both in pE and nonrenewable supply31. This is a consequence of the de-
mand not facing the same price as the nonrenewable producer receives. Hence the
demand responds to the decrease in the purchaser price while the nonrenewable
producer responds to the increase in the electricity price. The other schemes, on
the other hand, show limited sensitivity to the changes imposed. These results
highlight the difference in risk allocation, especially to the producer and investor
in renewable energy production. The income of the renewable producer in the GC
scheme is extremely sensitive to shocks on the supply side and small changes in
effective production time can make production unprofitable. In the feed-in tariff
31Normally one would expect to find a negative correlation between electricity price and supply.
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scheme, the renewable producers income per energy unit sold is unaffected by sup-
ply changes and the increased amount of production leads to an increase in total
revenues. A 10 hour increase in production time hardly affects a market without
support scheme, but illustrates the signs of changes in price and quantity expected
to follow larger changes.
Assuming the sudden ”shock” has a long-term effect, we are interested in how
this will affect the decision of the potential wind park investor. Based on the
pE and pGC found after implementing the positive supply shock and a slightly
reduced investment cost per yearly added MWh, c in the model32, the changes
in the probability of an investment taking place within the next two years are as
displayed in table 10. Under the feed-in tariff the investor’s decision is only affected
by the supply shock through its effect on yearly effective production hours as the
fixed guaranteed price remains constant. In a market without support system the
investor’s probability of investing has a slightly positive development, indicating
that by augmenting the total supply from renewable sources the investor is more
prone to invest. Not surprisingly, the GC price’s extreme sensitivity to changes
in the renewable supply has a major effect on the investor’s decision. From table
10 we see that the probability of investing drops by 70.89%. This indicates a
probability of investing within the next two years of 5.12%, meaning that the GC
scheme performs even poorer than the no scheme case. For a negative supply
”shock” we would see relative changes of similar magnitude, though having the
opposite signs.
Table 10: The relative change in the probability of investing within the next two years
after a positive supply ”shock” in the different support schemes
Support Scheme GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
∆Pr(X<X∗) –70.89% 0.73% 0.81%
The GC scheme’s high sensitivity to renewable energy production volume can be
explained by the low demand elasticity, which restricts the increase in electricity
demand in response to the rising supply. This naturally also applies to certificates,
and a small increase in certificate issuance can hence result in an over-supply and
the price rapidly approaching zero33. In the real world the results would however
have a less extreme nature as the opportunity to store, or bank, certificates is
opened. In real life the demand of GCs is based on the yearly consumed elec-
tricity, a fraction of which must be submitted within a fixed date the following
32Due to the increased number of effective production hours.
33In accordance with the martingale condition.
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year34. Because of this lag in the demand of GCs the renewable suppliers have the
possibility of banking GCs for future sale if they observe over-supply one year35.
Amundsen et al. (2006) argues that in a market including banking, speculators will
buy the commodity for storage in periods of abundance, when prices would sink
in a no-banking scenario. Hence prices are driven up to the point of next period’s
expected price less depreciation. In scarcity the spiked demand will increase prices
to the point where storage is unprofitable, leading to a ”stock-out” and spiking
prices. With this flexibility the GC scheme is not as sensitive to oversupply as we
observe in our model, though results from the market show a stable over-supply
in the market and an increasing level of the accumulated level of banked GCs.
Demand shock As with changes in the supply conditions, a ”shock” on the
demand side will cause changes in the purchaser price and its composition as well
as in the ratio between renewable and non-renewable energy supply. Table 11
shows the changes resulting from a 1% increase and 1% decrease in total demand
respectively giving a positive and a negative demand shock.
Table 11: Changes in electricity price pE , certificate price pGC , purchaser price pD and
renewable and non-renewable electricity production QGC and QN for a 1% demand
increase and 1% decrease in electricity demand
Positive shock GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
∆pGC – 6.17% – –
∆pE + 5.10% + 5.56% + 2.49%
∆QGC + 1.0% 0.0 + 95.4%
∆pD + 4.5% – –
Negative shock
∆pGC + 5.9% – –
∆pE – 4.9% – 5.4% – 2.4%
∆QGC – 1.0% 0.0 – 95.4%
∆pD – 4.4% – –
The results from the demand shocks show that the market is as sensitive for posi-
tive as it is for negative shocks. We therefore, as was done under the supply shock,
analyse the two scenarios under one. Considering the positive demand shock it is
34In the Swedish/Norwegian market this date is set to 1. April.
35In the Norwegian system banked certificates are valid for submittance, and can hence be
banked, throughout the lifetime of the scheme.
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natural to expect to observe an increase in the supply to satisfy the augmented
demand. We see that all the schemes experience an increase in the electricity price
when demand goes up which hence indeed does induce a higher supply. Regarding
the renewable supply, this increases both in the GC system and the no support
system, where especially the relative change under the latter is noteworthy. This
extreme growth is a result of the electricity price surpassing the range where the
profitability of renewable technology increases rapidly. In the feed-in tariff the
renewable supply remains constant as the renewable producer is not affected by
the changes in demand. An interesting observation is the dynamics of the GC
price, both according to the change in renewable supply and to the increasing de-
mand. Although the GC price decreases, the renewable producer has incentives to
increase renewable supply. This is a result of the increase in the electricity price
being higher than the drop in the GC price, and hence the investor’s total revenues
increases.
As with the supply shock, we are also interested in how the demand changes will
affect the investor’s willingness to invest under the different schemes. Table 12
shows the relative changes in the investment probabilities for a positive demand
”shock”. The feed-in tariff investor is unaffected as the fixed price stays constant.
In the GC scheme we observe that the demand shock only induces a minor change
in the investor’s behavior, in contrast to the major influence of the supply shock.
The development is slightly positive in the terms of increasing the probability
of investing as a result of growth in the potential total revenue. The investor
operating in a market with no support scheme shows the highest sensitivity to
changes in demand, where the positive demand shock has a rising effect on the
investment probability.
Table 12: The relative change in the probability of investing within the next two years
after a positive demand ”shock” in the different support schemes
Support Scheme GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
∆Pr(X<X∗) 0.74% 0.00% 6.01%
An overall conclusion from evaluating both supply and demand shocks is that
regarding the renewable supply the feed-in tariff scheme is, not surprisingly, the
least sensitive to any changes as the renewable producer is not subject to this risk.
Further we see that the no support system has the lowest sensitivity to the relative
changes brought by the shock. Finally we note that the sensitivity according to
supply changes is far more substantial than to demand changes. This can have its
reasoning in the supply and demand elasticities where the supply is slightly more
sensitive than the demand.
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5 Conclusion
Many different market funding- and penalty schemes and other governmental tools
exists to evoke investment in production technology for renewable energy sources.
Although in varying configurations, the green certificate scheme and the feed-in
tariff have become the dominating alternatives among the support scheme. This
paper places its initial focus on the green certificate scheme and introduces the
combination of an equilibrium model for simultaneously describing supply and
demand of electricity and green certificates, and real options valuation theory.
The investment decision is analysed by defining future cash flows as deterministic
through the equilibrium expressions and placing the uncertainty in the investment
cost.
We have presented an initial analysis of the green certificate market focusing on
the influence of the set market properties and the quota level on the price seen
by the distributor, the income of the producers and on the quantity of electricity
produced. We find that the model does present the expected results of an increas-
ing supply of energy from renewable sources with increasing quota and a slightly
convex curve for development in the purchaser price. Through the real options
framework we also discuss the effects of varying the quota on an investor’s deci-
sion as this factor possesses an essential position in allocating the market revenues.
This analysis shows that increasing α leads to the investor being less sensitive to
cost and hence a higher probability of investment.
Further we performed a general comparison of the results to those of a system
using the feed-in tariff scheme and one without any applied support arrangement.
The results showed that the tested support schemes indeed have the wanted effect
on the supply of renewable energy compared to the no support scheme scenario.
Within a valid range of quotas, we however find that the increase in the renewable
share resulting from the GC scheme also brings an increase in the total consump-
tion of electricity, which in most markets is an unfortunate development. However,
in the Swedish/Norwegian electricity market a great majority of the production
capacity not connected to the certificate scheme, which in this article hence is
defined as non-renewable, is hydro power, which minimizes this issue.
Using representative configurations for the market properties of both alternatives,
the feed-in tariff performs better in respect of inducing investment in renewable
sources, hence contributes to a larger increase in renewable production capacity.
On the other hand, the GC scheme does prove to be more efficient in reducing the
supply from nonrenewable sources. Hence the feed-in tariff leads to a higher ratio
of renewable energy in the market. We also present arguments for the feed-in tariff
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paying the renewable producer in excess of what is needed to cover the marginal
costs and hence being a better facilitator of initiative within R&D. Our findings
also state that the GC scheme shows a substantially higher sensitivity to quantity
”shocks”, especially in supply, than the other schemes. Our overall results hence
indicates that, within the limitations set in this paper, the feed-in tariff is the best
choice for reaching the specific goal of increased investment in production technol-
ogy for energy from renewable sources. When also regarding a target of reducing
overall energy consumption, stabilize the market’s reactions to sudden changes in
the supply or demand while also minimizing the social cost of the scheme, the
answer however becomes more ambiguous.
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Appendices
A Derivation of calibration coefficients CD, CR
and CN
As explained above, all comparative analyses on the respective market base-cases
are performed using the same supply- and demand elasticities, intercept, and cal-
ibration coefficients. The elasticities and intercept have been exogenously set on
the basis of observations and intuitions about the market described in section 3.
Equations (2) and (3) describe the equilibrium conditions under which the invest-
ment decision is made in the market adopting the green certificate scheme, as
does equations (19) and (20) for the feed-in tariff market and the market without
support scheme respectively. In order to find global values for CD, CR and CN ,
we perform three calibrations, one for each market in question, and set the global
level to the average of the three respective solutions. The calibration is performed
using monthly sample data for the Swedish/Norwegian market from NordPool and
certificate price data from NECS dating from 2004 to 2013.
The algorithm is based on an iterative approach using a least squares method to
set the optimal coefficients. In each iteration, C-values are set and inserted into
the equilibrium equation(s) for the respective market, which are solved for the
unknown(s) pE (and pGC)36. The resulting prices are presented in the [1x1] ([1x2])
vector P . This is used to calculate the sum of the squared differences between the
price suggested by the model, P , and each of the observed prices in the input-data.
By iteratively changing the C-values, the algorithm works towards the optimal Cs
by minimizing the sum of squared differences, and hence finds the CD, CR and
CN which results in the price(s) best fitting the price data. The global C-values
used in the comparative analyses, are as mentioned found by calculating the aver-
age CD, CR and CN from the results of the three individual market configurations.
Table 13: Alternative combinations of elasticities with resulting calibration coefficients
Alternatives CD CR CN
Green Certificates 169.93 61.72,98 59.39
Feed-in 169.20 59.51 56.34
No scheme 170.58 61.14 60.15
Average 169.90 60.79 58.62
36In this procedure we use the average values of the prices in the dataset as our initial guess.
40
B Probability distribution of the mean reverting
process
We want to derive the probability of investing in the wind park within a future
time t. Considering the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reverting process in equation
4, which is a Gaussian process, the expected value at time t and its variance can
be derived using the Kolmogorov forward equation and applying the moment-
generating function for the variable, as can be seen in Dixit & Pindyck (1994). If
the current value of X is X0 then the process of Xt is normally distributed
37 with
expected future value at time t equal to
E[Xt] = X¯ + (X0 − X¯)e−ηt (21)
where η is the speed at which X revert against X¯. Further the variation of (Xt−X¯)
is
V ar[Xt − X¯] = σ
2
2η
(
1− e−2ηt) (22)
The probability of investing within time t where the time steps are measured
monthly, ∆t = 1
12
, is derived by converting the normal random variable, X, to
normal standard, z;
z =
X − E[Xt]√
V ar[Xt − X¯]
Inserting the relevant values for the parameters which are used in the real option
model; η = 0.05, σ = 0.2 and X¯ = 2 and setting the current level of X, X0, to
2.1 we find the expected future value when t = 24 to be E[Xt] = 2.03 and the
V ar = 0.3637 and
√
V ar = 0.60308. The investor will invest when X reaches the
optimal investment value X∗ derived from the real options model for each scenario.
To find the likelihood of investing in the next two years we find the probability of
X < X∗ when t = 24 using
Pr(X < X∗) = Pr
(
X − E[Xt]√
V ar
<
X∗ − E[Xt]√
V ar
)
= N
(
X∗ − E[Xt]√
V ar
)
(23)
Applying this to the different cases with their related investment rules, X∗, from
the real option analysis we get the following probabilities for investment within
the next two year period:
And similar the results for the different schemes case:
37As explained in Franco (2003).
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Table 14: The optimal investment rule for different values of the required quota and the
respective probabilities of investing in the wind park within the next two years
Level Quota α = 0.02 α = 0.07 α = 0.15
X∗ 1.26 1.47 1.83
Pr(X < X∗) 10.26% 17.60% 37.13%
Table 15: The optimal investment rule for the different support schemes and the re-
spective probabilities of investing in the wind park in each scheme within the next two
years
Support Scheme GC Feed-In Tariff No Support
X∗ 1.47 1.58 1.21
Pr(X < X∗) 17.60% 22.99% 8.62%
42
References
Abadie, L. M., & Chamorro, J. M. 2005. Valuation of energy investments as
real options: The case of an integrated gasification combined cycle power plant.
Energy Economics, 30(4), 1850–1881.
Abadie, L. M., Chamorro, J. M., & Aguirre, A. L. 2012. Valuation of wind energy
projects: A real options approach. Basque Centre for Climate Change (bc3)
Working paper, 11.
Adkins, R., & Paxson, D. 2013. Subsidies for renewable energy facilities under
uncertainty. Proceedings of real options conference (2013).
Amundsen, E. S., & Mortensen, J. B. 2001. The Danish green certificate system:
some simple analytical results. Energy Economics, 23(5), 489–509.
Amundsen, E. S., Baldursson, F. M., & Mortensen, J. B. 2006. Price volatility and
banking in green certificate markets. Environmental and Resource Economics,
35(4), 259–287.
Bessembinder, H., & Lemmon, M. L. 2002. Equilibrium pricing and optimal hedg-
ing in electricity forward markets. Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1347–1382.
Boomsma, T. K., & Linnerud, K. 2013. Termination of renewable energy support
schemes: How uncertainty may speed up investment schemes. Working paper,
University of Copenhagen.
Boomsma, T. K., Meade, N., & Fleten, S.-E. 2012. Renewable energy investments
under different support schemes: A real options approach. European Journal of
Operational Research, 220(1), 225–237.
Borenstein, Severin, & Bushnell, James. 1999. An empirical analysis of the poten-
tial for market power in California’s electricity industry. Journal of Industrial
Economics, 47(3), 285–323.
Bye, T. 2003. On the price and volume effects from green certificates in the energy
market. Discussion paper. Statistics Norway, Research Department.
Carmona, R., Fehr, M., Hinz, J., & Porchet, A. 2010. Market design for emission
trading schemes. SIAM Review, 52(3), 403–452.
Chesney, M., & Taschini, L. 2011. The endogenous price dynamics of emission
allowances and an application to CO2 option prices. Swiss Finance Institute
Research Paper Series N’08-02.
43
Coulon, M., Khazaei, J., & Powell, W. B. 2013. SMART-SREC: A stochas-
tic model of the New Jersey solar renewable energy certificate market.
http://energysystems.princeton.edu/Papers/Coulon
de Magalha˜es Ozorio, L., de Lamare Bastian-Pinto C., & Branda˜o, L. E. 2012.
The choice of stochastic process in real option valuation. Proceedings of real
options conference (2012).
del R´ıo, P. 2012. The dynamic efficiency of feed-in tariffs: The impact of different
design elements. Energy Policy, 41, 139–151.
Dixit, A. K., & Pindyck, R. S. 1994. Investment under uncertainty, 1994. Princeton
UP, Princeton.
Fagiani, R., & Hakvoort, R. 2014. The role of regulatory uncertainty in certificate
markets: A case study of the Swedish/Norwegian market. Energy Policy, 65,
608–618.
Finon, D., & Menanteau, P. 2003. The static and dynamic efficiency of instruments
of promotion of renewables. Energy Studies Review, 12(1), 3.
Fischer, C. 2006. How can renewable portfolio standards lower electricity prices.
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper, Resources for the Future, Washing-
ton, DC, 06–20.
Franco, J. C. G. 2003. Maximum likelihood estimation of mean reverting processes.
Real Options Practice.
Holstad, M., & Pettersen, F. E. L. 2011. Hvordan reagerer strømforbruket i almin-
nelig forsyning p˚a endringer i spotpris? Rapporter.
Huisman, R., Stradnic, V., & Westgaard, S. 2013. Renewable energy and electricity
prices: Indirect empirical evidence from hydro power. IEB Working Paper N.
2013/024.
Jensen, S. G., & Skytte, K. 2002. Interactions between the power and green
certificate markets. Energy Policy, 30(5), 425–435.
Johnsen, T. A. 2001. Demand, generation and price in the Norwegian market for
electric power. Energy Economics, 23(3), 227–251.
Kumbarog˘lu, G., Madlener, R., & Demirel, M. 2008. A real options evaluation
model for the diffusion prospects of new renewable power generation technolo-
gies. Energy Economics, 30(4), 1882–1908.
44
Lemming, J. 2003. Financial risks for green electricity investors and producers in
a tradable green certificate market. Energy Policy, 31(1), 21–32.
Montgomery, W. D. 1972. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control pro-
grams. Journal of Economic Theory, 5(3), 395–418.
Morthorst, P. E. 2003. A green certificate market combined with a liberalised
power market. Energy Policy, 31(13), 1393–1402.
NECS- Registry of Norwegian certificate statistics. Accessed May 15, 2014. url:
http://necs.statnett.no/WebPartPages/SummaryPage.aspx.
NordPool- Database of Nordic electricity statistics. Accessed May 15, 2014.
Ozorio, L. de Magalha˜es, Bastian-Pinto, C. de Lamare, Baidya, T. N., & Brandao,
L. E. T. 2012. Mean Reversion with Drift and Real Options in Steel Industry.
Brazilian Review of Finance, 10(2), 215–241.
Pindyck, R. S. 1993. Investments of uncertain cost. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 34(1), 53–76.
Rubin, J. D. 1996. A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and
borrowing. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 31(0044),
269–286.
Sarkar, S. 2003. The effect of mean reversion on investment under uncertainty.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(2), 377–396.
Schwartz, E. S. 1997. The stochastic behavior of commodity prices: Implications
for valuation and hedging. Journal of Finance, 52(3), 923–973.
Seifert, J., Uhrig-Homburg, M., & Wagner, M. 2008. Dynamic behavior of CO2
spot prices. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 56(2), 180–
194.
Verbruggen, A., & Lauber, V. 2012. Assessing the performance of renewable
electricity support instruments. Energy policy, 45, 635–644.
45
